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The Informational Content of Bond Ratings
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the risk structure of interest rates. More
specifically, we ask whether yields on industrial and commercial bonds
indicate that market participants base their evaluations of a bond issue's
default risk on agency ratings or on publically available financial sta-
tistics. Using a non—linear least squares procedure, we relate the yield
to maturity to Moody's rating, Standard & Poor's rating, and accounting
measures of creditworthiness such as coverage and leverage. We find that
market yields are significantly correlated with both the ratings and with a
set of readily available financial accounting statistics. These results
indicate Ci) that market participants base their evaluations of ap issue's
creditworthiness on more than the agencies' ratings and (2) that the
ratings bring some information to the market above and beyond that con-
tained in the set of accounting variables. In addition, our results
suggest that the market views Moody's and S&P's ratings as equally reliable
measures of risk. Although the accounting measures also affect yields on
new or recently reviewed issues, our analysis suggests that the market may
pay more attention to the accounting measures and less to the ratings if
therating has not been reviewed recently.
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Atlanta, GA 30303THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF BOND RATINGS
Publicly Issued corporate bonds are normally rated by one or both of thetwo
major rating agencies: Moody's and Standard and Poor's.Although there is clearly
a demand for this service, several authors have concluded from theempirical
evidence •that these ratings contain little new information.For instance, it has
been shown that approximately two—thirds of theratings can be predicted on the
basis of a handful of readily available financialstatistics (see below). In
addition,several studies have concluded that bond and stockprices adjust before,
not after, rating changes on outstanding Issuesareannounced (Hettenhouse and
Sartorls, 1976; Weinstein, 1977).
On the other hand, extant statistical models havenot been able to predict all
ratings while other studies (Katz, 1974; Grler and Katz, 1976;Griffin and
Sanvlcente, 1982) indicate that markets do react to ratingchange announcements.
Furthermore, there is some theoretical basis for the view thatratings provide an
informational service. First, obtaining andproperly evaluating public Information
Is costly. It may be cheaper for a specializedagency to evaluate the
creditworthiness of a firm or a bond issue than for all (or most)potential
purchasers to do so. Second, ratings may provide a means ofconveying relevant
inside information to bondholders withoutproviding full information to the entire
marketplace (especially the firm's competitors). Standard and Poor's(1979),
Belkaoul (1983) and Sherwood (1976) all claim that in factrating agencies do
receive a considerable quantity of sensitive information,including projections and
plans, which are held In strictest confidence. Consequently,
ratings may provide
relevant Information without providing the details. The finalbasis for believing
that ratings may possess Information is the fact that bondissuers and purchasers
are willing to pay for rating services.1—2—
This question of the informational content of bond ratings is the subject of
the present paper. Specifically we seek to answer the following questions:
1. Do market yields (prices) on bonds Indicate that market participants view
ratings as reflecting only readily available Information, I.e., as providing
no new information?
2. Do market yields indicate that market participants view all relevant informa-
tion regarding an issue's creditworthiness as adequately represented by its
rating(s)?
3.If the market views ratings as important, do market participants rely relati-
vely more on one rating agency than the other?
4. Does the information content of ratings decline over time, i.e., do market
participants regard recently released ratings as better indicators of credit
risk than ratings which have not been reviewed recently?
In the following section we review previous research which Is particularly
relevant to this question of the information content of bond ratings. This research
may be divided into three groups:(1) studies of the determinants of bond ratings,
(2) studies of market adjustments to rating changes, and (3) cross—sectional studies
of bond yields. In section II, we explain our approach to these questions which
Involves estimating the cross—sectional relationship between the market yields on
bond issues, Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings, and readily available
accounting measures of creditworthiness. Results are then presented and discussed
in section III.
I. Previous Research
Inthis section several of the more Importantstudies which have addressed
questionsgermaneto our study are discussed. This analysis is fairly thorough in
orderto provide theappropriate benchmark for evaluating our approach and contribu-
tion.—3—
A.Investigations of Bond Ratings
While not explicitly examining the infolination content question, studies of the
determinants of bond ratings do call into question the importance of these
ratings. As noted above, numerous studies (surveyed in Altman, 1981 and Belkaoui,
1983) have found that roughly two—thirds of the ratings on new Issues can be
predicted on the basis of a handful of financial statistics. Of course, this also
means that for approximately one—third of the bond issues actual ratings differ from
what these models predict. If this disparity occurs because ratings reflect
additional information which is not readily available, then ratings do bring
information to the market.If they differ because the models do not adequately or
accurately reflect the agencies' use of readily available information or because of
random differences in judgment on borderline issues, then no new information is
being provided.2
B. Market Adjustment to Rating Changes
Most recent studies of the informational content of ratings haye focused on
reactions in debt and equity markets to rating changes. While the measures of
market reactions differ, all bond market studies have followed somewhat similar
procedures In attempting to separate the effect of the rating change from other
influences on bond prices and yields. Each uses an index or measure of the yield,
price change, or holding period return on the rerated issue relative to some chosen
benchmark. The various measures and benchmarks are summarized in Table 1 which also
provides a description of the data and tests. For instance, Katz's (1974) measure
was Y Y0
—ft ,JtD jt *N *0 j
'jt —
where =yieldto maturity on issue j as of timet—4—
*0 =estimatedyield on an issue of the same coupon, maturity, and size
as j but with issue i's original rating. The estimate was obtained
by substituting values for coupon, etc. into a regression estimated
for that rating and month.
*N =estimatedyield for issue j given its new rating category.
1 if downgraded, —1 if upgraded.
According to Katz, 'jt should equal zero before any adjustment to a change in
the risk of default and one after the adjustment is complete. He found that indeed
the average Ijt was approximately equal to zero before the rating change, to .3 the
month of the rating change, and to one thereafter. Grier and Katz (1976) also
concluded that the market reacts after, not before, a rating change though they
performed no test of this hypothesis. However, with a different data set, index,
and benchmark, Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) concluded that the adjustment occurs
prior to the rating change.3
A somewhat different approach was taken by Weinstein (1977). Examining the
difference between the holding period return on bonds with changed ratings and on
bonds with the original unchanged rating from 18 months before the rating change to
6 months after with the signs reversed for bonds rated downward, he concluded that
the adjustment generally occurred in the earlier period——well before the rating
change was announced. However, none of the 23 excess holding period return averages
which Weinstein presented in the paper were significantly different from zero.
There are several problems and limitations associated with Investigations of
market reactions to rating changes which make It difficult to draw conclusions from
them regarding the information content of ratings.
1. While there should be no market adjustment if the rating change provides no new
information, it is not clear that the size of the adjustment will be positively
related to the information contained in the rating change. The problem here is that
the magnitude of the adjustment depends on the rating house's promptness In revising
ratings as well as on the informational content. If rating agencies are prompt, a—5—
rating will be changed as soon as It crosses the borderline between the ratings.
The informational content of this change is high but the market adjustment may be
small because the market knows that the riskiness of the issue lies near this
borderline between the old and new ratings. If, on the other hand, the rating
agencies review Issues only intermittently and are slow to react, the riskiness of
the Issue may lie well within the new rating interval. The Informational content of
the rating change is lower In this case but the price adjustment would tend to be
larger.
2. The large price adjustments tend to occur in cases in which the companies are
receiving extensive negative publicity at about the same time the rating change is
announced. As a result it Is difficult to distinguish between the two effects.4
3. Price adjustments observed before a rating change by one agency may be due to an
earlier rating change by the other agency —notto public Information which eventu-
ally leads to the second rating change.5 When, for Instance, Weinstein observed
some adjustment over the 18 month period before Moody's changed its rating, it may
have been because some Issues were in the process of adjusting to a change in S&P's
rating which occurred during this period. When Katz found that yields were still
adjusting months after a S&P rating change, it may have been because of subsequent
rating changes by Moody.
4. Obviously all of these studies concentrate on revisions in ratings. We feel the
more important question Is whether the overall body of ratings, some years old,
bring Information to the market —notwhether the small sample of revised ratings
provide Information.
C. West's Cross—Sectional Study
West's (1973) is the only study of which we are aware which considers the
effect of all ratings —new,old, and recently revised —onyields. Using the
results of Fisher's yield to maturity study (1959)6, West argued that if ratings—6—
mattered independently of "the underlying economic factors" then high (low) rated
issues should tend to have lower (higher) yields than predicted i.e., negative
(positive) residuals. While little pattern was observed in the residuals of the
1927, 1932, and 1937 regressions, a significant (5Z level) majority of the issues
rated Baa or lower had positive residuals in 1949 and 1953. West concluded that
since this pattern was observed in '49 and '53 but not earlier, it probably was due
to the regulations introduced in the late 1930s and 1940s requiring that bonds rated
Baa or below be carried on banks.' books at market value.7
There are problems with the West—Fisher approach as well. Important measures
of default risk such as interest coverage and subordination status were not included
In Fisher's equation, nor were call protection and the tax advantages of discount
bonds considered. Moreover, it is not obvious that the yield relationship is log—
linear as they assumed. If It is not, then ratings may appear to influence yields
because of this specification error. Finally, as West acknowledges, the possibility
that ratings are revised to reflect market rates cannot be ruled out, i.e., yields
any influence ratings—not vice versa.
II. The Method and Data
A. Overview and Data
In this study we seek to determine the information content of ratings by
regressing the yields to maturity of various bond Issues both on dummy variables
representing Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings and on variables representing
readily available Information regarding the issuing firm and the bond Issue
Itself. This approach avoids the previously discussed problems associated with
rating change studies and our specification avoids most of the problems of the West—
Fisher study though reverse causation cannot be completely ruled out. Implicit In
this approach Is the assumption that any information provided by ratings is—7.-
primarily information concerning the Issue's creditworthiness. While we do not rule
out the possibility that information on marketability, etc. is also provided by
ratings and that such information may affect bond yields, the rating agencies
describe and sell their ratings as measures of creditworthiness or ability to pay.8
The relationship which we estimate is
=f(Ci. R. Xj. uj)
(1)
where
Vjis the yield to maturity on issue j,
Cjrepresents a set of publicly available financial accounting data
pertaining to the Issuing firm and known characteristics of the bond issue
which may be regarded as relevant in assessing its creditworthiness,
includes both Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings of the issue,
x represents characteristics of the issue, other than measures of credit-
worthiness, which might be expected to influence its yield, e.g., call
protectionand term to maturity, and
is a random error term.
The hypothesis that ratings provideno information beyond the publicly
available information in Cj and that ratings do not Influence yields because of
regulatory constraintsthat require or encourage certain bond buyers to hold only
bonds rated above a certainlevel, implies thatratings can be suppressed in the
estimationof equation (1), i.e.,
Yj =f(C,Xj, uj). (2)
Thehypothesis that market participants base their evaluation of creditworthiness
solely on ratingsimplies that the information set Cjcan be suppressed or that
= f (Rd,X, u)
(3)
Inorder to test these hypotheses and the relative importance of Moody's rat-
ings versus Standard and Poor's, data were collected on a sample of bonds issued by
industrial and commercial firms. Since it was feared that dealer quotes on thinly
traded issues might not reflect true market equilibrium prices, the sample was—8—
restrictedto bonds listed on the UYSE or ASE which traded during the three day
period: February 27 —March1, 1979. The sample was also restricted to bonds or
notes with at least five years to maturity, to bonds rated by both rloody's and S&P,
andto issues of firms with five years of data on the COMPUSTAT tape prior to
December 31,1978.Finally, we included no more than twobondissues of any one
firm.1° The final sample consisted of 176 bond Issues.
B.Characteristics Reflecting the Creditworthiness of the Issue and Issuer.
The specification of the components ofCj and oftheirrelationship to Yj Is
crucial to any test of the first hypothesis ,I.e.,that ratings possess no informa-
tion content. Ideally C should Include all publicly available Information on both
the bond issue and issuer which market participants view to be Important In
determining the issue's creditworthiness. While some evidence on this issue is
presented below, there is no a priori assurance that our chosen C Is exhaustive.
Consequently, If the hypothesis that ratings do not Influence yields Is rejected by
our data, we can only conclude that ratings add information over an above that
contained in the chosen data set Cj.11 This additional information may Itself be
readily available.12 If, however, the R are Insignificant for our chosen Ci, they
should also be Insignificant for the true Cj as well.
While financial analysts have suggested that numerous measures are useful in
assessing a firm or bond's creditworthiness, most seem to fall Into four general
categories (Altman, 1981; Standard & Poors, 1979): (1) measures of balance sheet
leverage, (2) measures of Interest coverage, (3) measures of profitability or cash
flow and (4) characteristics of the bond contract, e.g. subordination status. In
addition, rating studies have Invariably found a strong correlation between firm
size and ratings and market participants may well regard large firms as less risky,
ceteris paribus. On this basis, the following variables were chosen for Inclusion
in data set Ci:—9—
LEY —theratio of long term debt to total capitalization,
COy —afive year average of interest coverage measured as the pretax income
(before extraordinary items) plus interest charges divided by interest
charges,
DCOV deviations of coverage from a five year trend line measured as the
square root of the sum of the squared deviations,
PRO the ratio of pretax income to total assets —afive year average,
DPRO deviations of profits from a five year trend line measured as for
DCOV,
ASSET —thefirm's total assets,'3
SUB — adummy which equaled one if the issue was subordinated and zero
otherwi Se.
Except for SUB, all data were taken from the COMPUSTAT tapes for fiscal years
ending before December 31, 1978, i.e., two months were allowed for release of the
data. Since Interest coverage and profitability often vary considerably from year
to year, one would expect that analysts consider more than just the •most recent
figures. Accordingly, five years of data were collected on these twovariables.
Since we expected that the market would attach more importance to more recent years,
we initially attempted to utilize a weighted average with geometrically declining
weights where the rate of decline was estimated as part of our non—linear least
squares estimation described below. Since the non—linear least squares could not
converge on weights for PRO and choose approximately equal weights for CDV in Ini-
tial runs, simple averages were used for simplicity.14 DCCV and DPRO were Included
because we expected that companies whose coverage and profitability deviated from
trend would be viewed as more risky. These were calculated by regressing CCV and
PRO on time, squaring and summing the deviations from these trend lines, dividing by
five and taking the square root.—10-
The functional form of the relationship between the accounting measures and Y,j
is important but unknown. Y should be positively related to leverage and the
deviation measures and negatively related to the other variables but the exact form
of this relation Is uncertain. In such situations researchers, e.g. Fisher and
West, normally assume a particular form —usuallylinear or logarithmic. Such a
procedure is particularly dangerous here. If the specified relation between Yj and
a variable such as leverage differs from the true relation, ratings may appear as
significant only because they are serving as proxies for the difference between the
true and chosen forms. To minimize any specification error, a power transformation
was applied to each continuous variable In Cj. In other words the specified form
was
=f(C.) + f (R.) + f (x.) + u. (4)
1 j 2j 3j
where
x1 '2
f1(C) = +1(I_E\') + 2(COV) + 3(DCOY) + (ASSET) + 5SUB (5)
Both the coefficientsand exponents X were estimated using non—linear least
squares which provides maximum likelihood estimates of both if Uj is normally
distributed. This is a very flexible form yet one which —unlikesay the polynomial
—meets our requirement that the signs of the first derivatives not change.
If= 1, the relation is linear and for X close to zero it approximates the
logarithmic.15 Of course this specification also includes the reciprocal, square,
and square root forms as special cases.
C. The Ratings
Tocapture the effect of ratings on V. dummy variables were Included to repre-
sent both Moody's and S&P's ratings of the Issue. Separate dummy variables were
defined for each rating except triple A, that Is SPAA,SPA,...,
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0. Other Factors Influencing Yields
While attention in the present study is focused on the effect on Y ofvariables
associated with the risk of default, yield to maturity may also be affected by the
issues' marketability, term to maturity, tax treatment, callability, and possibly
other provisions of the bond indenture. Since all issues In our sample were listed
on either the NYSE or ASE and all were actively traded during the observation
period, the observations do not differ greatly In marketability and accordingly no
variable to measure marketability was Included.'7
For the dates on which our sample was collected, the government security yield
curvewas continuously — but only slightly — downwardsloping over the terms to
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about tentofifteen basis points above those on the longest term bonds. Assuming,
as Fisher did, that the slope of the yield curve for corporate bonds should be
similar to that for government bonds, we chose to adjust the dependent variable, Y,
to a 25 year bond basis, Y, using the government bond yield curve.'8 These
adjustments were generally quite small—averaging only four basis points.
At equal pretax yields, bonds selling at a discount are obviously more attrac-
tive to taxable investors than otherwise equivalent bonds selling at par both
because they are less likely to •be called and because taxation of the discount may
be at a lower capital gains rate and/or deferred until maturity. If the difference
in callability is Ignored, the marginal investors' after tax expected yields over
the holding period should be equal for discount bonds and for bonds selling at
par.If the yield curve is fairly flat so that no change Intheyields on par bonds
Is expected over the period, equation (7) expresses the equality in after tax
returns on par and discount bonds.





Cp,Cd =couponson par and discount bonds respectively,
=pricesof par and discount bonds
t=thetax rate on interest income,
td
=theeffective, tax rate on the discount.19
E(Pd)
=theexpected price appreciation over the period on the discount
bond.
If no changes in market rates are expected during the period, then observed market
yields on the two issues may be expressed as—13—
C C +E(P) = an1d —___________
p d
After substituting these into equation 7, one obtains
=-) ( - (8)
Consequently, the variable TAX =(Y—.) wasincluded as an.Jndependent variable in
p
theestimated equation. Since TAX is a positive linear function of Y, spurious
_correlation may bias Its coefficient toward 1.20 However, since anegative coeffi-
cient is expected and unbiased estimation of this coefficient is not ourprimary
Interest, this is not expected to create serious problems.
Callprotection may takethe form of a stated restriction on callablifty and/or
adifferencebetween the market price and the call price. The latter is difficult
toseparate empirically from the tax advantages just discussed, and the TAX variable
justdefined undoubtedly represents both effects. Since only 20% of the issues in
our sample carried an unexpired call restriction, the number of years to the first
call date, CALL, was simply added to the equation in a linear form.
III RESULTS
A.Ratings
Beforeinvestigating the impact of both ratings and financial accounting vari-
ables on *,theeffect of each was examined separately beginning with ratings. The
distribution of Moody's and S&P's ratings is shown in Table 2 while the results of
the regression of *onthe ratings (in the manner described In equation 6) as well
as on TAX and CALL are shown In the first column of Table 3. The results are
generally as expected —thelower the rating, the higher the adjusted yield to
maturity. While the estimated differences between yields on AAA, AA, and A rated
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than the same S&P rating —theopposite of
assumptionsunderlying the specification 'In
rating as signifying a lower level of risk
the suggesti
equation6
on from Table 2.Since the
could not be rejected, weconclude that this specification is a reasonable model of theyield—rating
relationship.22
B. Accounting Indicators of Creditworthiness
Next1 the relationship between Y and the accounting variables,as well as SUB,
TAX, and CALL, was estimated. For each accounting variable both a coeffi-
cient, P, and an exponent, X, were estimated as described above. Bothprofitability
variables, PRO and DPRO proved insignificant, with extremelylarge standard
errors. Indeed, the non—linear estimation procedure failed toconverge after nurne—
rous Iterations when they were included in the equation —apparentlybecause of high
correlation with the coverage variables.23 Consequently, theequation was estimated
variables with the results shown in the second column of Table 3.
ypothesized that risk of default and *wouldbe directly related to
and inversely related to ASSETS and COY. Since fora particular van—
to x =xx1,the sign of the partial derivative depends on thesign
p and X. This Implies that for LEY and DCOV,and X should be of the
for ASSETS and COV of opposite sign. These expectationswere met for
except DCOV, deviations of coverage from trend, but Its coefficient is
not significant. However, It should be noted that, when apower form Is estimated,
t—statistjcs for a variable'sdo not provide a complete or reliable test of the
null hypothesis that *doesnot depend on that variable. The null hypothesis that
''isindependent of DCCV implies thatDC0V = and/or XDCOV =— . Thisnull may
be tested by estimating the equation with and without DCCV andtesting the
hypothesis using a likelihood ratio test or an F test. The resulting F statistics
for all four variables are shown in the first column of Table 5. Thecritical value
of F with 2 and 166 degrees of freedom Is about 3.05 at the .05 levelof
significance, so the null hypothesis that Y* is unrelated to DCCVcan be rejected at










Since our equation includes only four accounting measures of the firm's
creditworthiness, the sufficiency of our chosen set, Cj may be questioned.
Fortunately, evidence on this issue is available. While we included no more than
two bond issues for any one firm, our data set does contain multiple issues for
forty. firms. If important firm specific risk of default variables have been
excluded, then one would expect that the residuals from our estimated regression
would be positively correlated for issues of the same firm. If the market regards a
firm as more (less) risky than our equation estimates, then both residuals will tend
to be positive (negative). However, the r2 between the two was only .04 —versus
.66 for Y. Consequently, It appears that if important risk of default variables
have been excluded, they concern the specifics of the bond contract and not the
firm's credi tworthiness.
In section II we argued that the relationship between ADJY and the financial
accounting variables was probably neither linear nor log—linear and, as a result,
chose a more general form. Since each of the estimated exponents, X, is signifi-
cantly different from both zero and one, our supposition appears justified. For
further comparison, the equation was estimated in linear form and again with the
accounting variables in log form with the following results:
Specification: Unexplained Sum of Squares:
linear form 147.2
logarithmic form 102.2
power form (Table 3) 56.5
Clearly our form results in a much closer fit.
Since the chosen form includes the linear as a special case and can approximate—17—
the logarithmic, exact and approximate tests (respectively) of hypotheses that the
relation is linear and logarithmic can be constructed. Both hypotheses are rejected
at the .05 level.24
The power transformation makes it difficult to estimate the impact on ADJY of a
change in coverage, leverage, or firm size from thecoefficients in Table 3.
Consequently, estimates of the partial impact of a change in each are provided in
Table 6. Percentile values of each variable are shown in the first three columns of
Table 6.In other words, 20% of the bond issues in our sample were from firms with
less than $594 million in assets and 20% from firms with more than $7424 million.
The fourth column presents the estimated change in Y in basis points resulting from
a rise in each variable from Its 20th percentile value to Its median value, holding
the other three variables constant. Consider for Instance two firms with identical
alues for CDV, LEV, and DCOV. If one firm has assets of $2.424 million (the median
value) and the other assets of $594 million, the parameter estimates in Table 3
indicate that the latter's bond issues will carry an adjusted yield to maturity
approximately 48 basis points higher than the former's. The impactof a change in
each variable from its median to its 80th percentile value Is shown in the fifth
column.
The non—linearity of the relationship between the accounting variables and
yield is readily apparent from Table 6. Consider for Instance the effect of changes
In leverage. The 20th and 80th percentile values of leverage are approximately
equidistantfrom the median. Yet, while an issue of a firmwith the 80th percentile
valueof the ratio of long—term debt to total capitalization would have a market
yield about 38 basis points above that of the median firm, there Is only an 8 basis
pointdifference between the median and 20th percentilefirm. Itappearsthat
beyonda certain level, further decreases In the leverage ratio are regarded as
relatively unimportant.—18—
While there are many possible measures of the relative importance of various
variables, the estimated difference in Y* between the 20th and 80th percentile
values of each would provide one such indication. Using this yardstick, size would
appear to be the most important followed in order by leverage and coverage. This is
somewhat disconcerting since it suggeststhat small firms face substantially higher
borrowing costs than large firms with identical coverage and leverage ratios.25
C. Comparing the Information Content of Ratings and Accounting Information
It is Interesting and instructive that the adjusted R2 for the second equation
in Table 3 is slightly higher than the adjusted R2 for the first equation. This
suggests that these four accounting measures and the indication of subordination
status have at least as much information content as Moody's and Standard and Poor's
ratings combined. However, this does not necessarily mean that the ratings provide
no additional information since they may reflect different aspects of
creditworthiness.
In order to test the hypothesis that the ratings bring no inftrmation to the
market beyond that contained in the four accounting measures and SUB, an equation
including both ratings and accounting measures was estimated with the results shown
in the third colunii of Table 3. Based on a comparison of the unexplained sums of
squares of the second and third equations, the hypothesis that ratings provide no
additional Information is rejected at the .05 level, Of course the null hypothesis
that the C set of variables adds no information beyond that contained in the
ratings is also rejected.26
When the ratings and accounting variables are combined, the coeffictents of
both the ratings and the accounting variables are reduced. This was expected since
ratings depend at least partially on these variables. The final pair of columns in
Table 6 shows the estimated impact on Y (in basis points) of changes in each inde-—19—
pendent variable using parameter estimates from the combined equation from Table
3. Since ratings were included in this regression, these may be interpreted as
estimates of the impact on *ofchanges in each accounting variable given that the
issue's rating does not change.
F statistics for the individual accounting variables are shown in the final
colurm of Table 5. When ratings are added, leverage and subordination status (as
well as DCOV) are no longer significant at the .05 level. This is not sirprising
since subordination status does not change over time and leverage probablychanges
very little, so old ratings continue to reflect this information. Coverage remains
highly significant —possiblybecause it Is more likely to have changed since the
ratings were last reviewed. This may also be true of the measure of firm size,
ASSET, or it may be significant because the market attaches more weight or
importance to size (or coverage) than do the rating agencies.
The coefficients of the rating variables are also reduced when other measures
of creditworthiness are included. Since the financial accounting variables are held
constant, the coefficients of this expanded equation provide a more accurate esti-
mate of the likely market reaction to a rating change than the coefficients from the
earlier regression on ratings only (or, equivalently, than would be expected from
differences between mean ofthe various ratings classes). Indeed, according to
our estimated equation, a change from an AAA rating to AA or even A would probably
not to lead to a noticeable change In the market yield on the issue.27 A change in





=.44(1.35 —.51)=.37or 37 basis points. While not an
inconsequential change, it Is much smaller than the difference between the average
Baa yield for our sample (10.15) and the average Ba yield (11.08). This is to be
expected since only Moody's rating has changed —notS&P's or the accounting
van ables.issues at different ends of the risk
that the non—accounting information
the market as more (less) important
less creditworthy firms than In dis
generally less risky firms. It is
explain very little of the observed
Aaa, Aa, and A rated issues and much
Issues. The results in Table 6 sugg
ables as well, but the relative expl
ables at different ends of the risk
In order to examine the relativ
explain differences In *amonghigh
explain differences among low qual
A or above and issues rated below
shown In the first column of Tabi
adjusted yields of the 98 issues
three ratings was .276 percentage
It is possible
may be viewed by
among the issues of small,
li—known, and




ratings and accounting van—
Sunclear.
of ratings and accounting
issues separately from thel
—20—
Finally, one will note that the estimated weighting factor, 'y, remains in-
significantly different from .5. However, it is now slightly less than .5 which
would imply —ifthe difference were significant —thatthe market attaches slightly
more weight to S&P's ratings than Moody's after considering the information in the
accounting variables.
Having compared the explanatory power of ratings and accounting variables on an
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Ityissues, the sample was split into issues
A.28Intra—group variances in adjusted yiel
e 7.For example, the variance of observed
ratedA or above about the mean ADJY for those
points. Clearly this Intra—group variance was
rated
ds are
much larger for the lower quality issues In our sample, i.e., there is a much
greater variation to be explained.
The mean squared residuals from the rating and accounting measure regressions,D. Rating Depreciation
The rating agencies insist their analysts monitor all corporate rati
ongoing basis, and S&P (1979, p.18) maintains all its ratings are formall
at least once a year. However, rating reviews are announced only internii
rating changes tend to be clustered around new offerings, exchange offers
rather than continuously distributed across time. Consequently, one woul
that a new or recently reviewed rating would be viewed by the market as a









respectively, are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 7. Clearly neither ratings nor
accounting variables explain much of the variation in yields among higher quality
issues. This suggests that the market may have viewed risk differences between
these issues as insignificant at this time so that *basicallyvaried among these
issues for reasons unrelated to creditworthiness. On the other hand, accounting
variables explain more of the variation among lower quality issues.29 Indeed, it is
apparent that the lower of the accounting variables equation versus the ratings
equation in Table 3 arises from the ability of the former to explain yield differ-
ences among lower quality issues rather than among higher quality issues or between
the two groups.
For the combined regression, the average mean squared error Is approximately 22
basis points and is approximately the same for high and low quality issues —
slightly higher for the former surprisingly. While the source of this unexplained
variation in yields is unclear, It appears that it does not represent unexplained
differences in the perceived creditworthiness of various firms. If unexplained
differences in creditworthiness remained, then one would expect a positive
correlation between the residuals for issues of the same firm.In fact, the
correlation is nil (adjusted r2 =.001)and negative in sign.— 22-
reviewed recently. If a rating review has not been announced In years, bond pur—
chasers may focus more on recent accounting information and less on the rating.
To test this hypothesis, data were collected on the length of time, tj, since a
rating change or review was last announced by Moody's. Only Moody's ratings were
considered because dates of reviews which did not necessarily result in rating
changes were available for Moody's but not S&P. We assumed that ratings five or
more years old were viewed as equally reliable, i.e., tj =5for all issues not
formally reviewed within the last five years (14% of our sample).






where includes only Moody's ratings. In other words, a decay or depreciation
rate, D, was estimated for Moody's ratings. A D >0implIes that as time since
review, t,j, increases less weight Is attached to the rating Information and more to
the accounting information in determining market yields.3°
When the revised equation was estimated using non—linear least squares, the
estimated value of D was .054, a plausible, positive figure. This estimate would
imply that the market attaches about 15% more weight to a new or just reviewed
rating than to one set three years ago. However, the estimated asymptotic standard
error of D was .063 so this estimate is not significantly different from zero.
Consequently, the question of whether the information content of ratings declines
over time cannot be viewed as settled.
Finally we would note that the estimatedIn equation 9 is significantly less
than i.31 This would imply that accounting measures affect yields on new as well as
old issues. In other words, the accounting variables are not significant in the
combined equation in Table 3 merely because the rating agencies are slow to adjust
their ratings to reflect this new information. These results suggest that the
market considers both ratings and accounting measures In evaluating the creditworth-
iness of new issues as well.—23—
IV.CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we find:
1) Market participants base their evaluations of a bond issue's creditworthiness on
more than Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings. Specifically, it is clear
that they consider recent financial statistics.
2)Market yields also vary withratings independently of the financial accounting
variableswe consider.
3)Therelationship between accounting measures of creditworthiness and market
yieldsis not a simple one. Both linear and log linear forms are rejected.
4) The market apparently views Moody and S&P ratings as interchangeable and as
equally reliable indicators of an Issue's creditworthiness.
5) Though the relationship Is a weak one, our data suggest that market participants
pay less attention to ratings and more to publicly available accounting Informa-
tion iftherating has not been reviewed in some time. Nonetheless, both are
important in the case of new and old issues.
Questions regarding bondratings and creditworthiness or risk of default con-
tinue to fascinate financial market researchers. The number of studies seeking to
relate ratings to accounting measures of risk is now legion [see Belkaoui (1983) or
Altman, 1981)]. Strangely enough, however, few since Fisher (1959) have asked how
market yields are related to measures of credit risk —eitherrating or accounting
measures. We obviously feel that the latter question, which we have analyzed In
this paper, is the more important one. We also feel It is the more fruitful field
for further research. Certainly numerous questions remain which the general
approach we have outlined above seems .ipable of answering. For instance, one might—24—
ask if other measures of creditworthiness are important? Or, do the unexplained
yield differences represent additional differences in the perceived
creditworthiness, differences in marketability, other systematic differences or
random variations? Finally, are unrated issues viewed as more risky than rated
issues with the same size, coverage, and leveragecharacteristics?32 Perhaps our
efforts will stimulate additional research in this area.—25—
Footnotes
1tintil 1968. publicatIon sales to subscribers (presumably bond purchasers) consti-
tuted the rating houses' sole source of revenue. Currently, however, fees paid by
the issuers constitute the major revenue source (Weinstein, 1977). According to
Standard and Poor's (1979) these fees ranged from $500 to $15,000 per issue in the
late 1970's. WeinsteIn (1977) has expressed some puzzlement at the fact that bond
issuers rather than bond purchasers —"theusers" —paythe major cost. One may
conjecturethat this occurs partially because the rating agencies find it difficult
torestrict use of the ratings to subscribers only and partially because failure to
obtain a rating may be taken as a negative signal by bond purchasers. Purchasers
may suspect that the issuer did not seek a rating because a low rating was anticipa-
ted or because they had something to hide. While issuers would not be willing to
pay for the establishment of rating houses, they may find it advantageous to have
their debt rated once the houses are established.
2Moocjy's and S&P's ratings on new industrial issues differ about one—third of the
time from what the models predict and about 15Z of the time from each other. Ede—
rington (1983) attributes these split ratings to random differences In judgment
rather than to any systematic difference between the two agencies. Consequently,
some of the misciassifications are probably due to random fluctuations in judgment
on borderline cases but It isn't clear that all are.
3whether their results warrant such a conclusion is debatable. The significant
differences are generally from the index value six months before the rating change
to the index value six months after —whichleaves the timing of the shift
unclear. Moreover, Hettenhouse and Sartoris show that their index should equal 1
before any market adjustment and 0 after it is complete. •However, for issues which
were subsequently downgraded, the index was above 1 before the change and only fell
to 1 afterwards.
4This is particularly true since noneof these studies consider the price or yield
justbefore and just after a rating announcement but at the beginning and end of the
month.
5A1tmanfound a median lag of six months between rating changes by the two agencies
though It was quite variable. Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) considered market
reactions to rating changes by both Moody's and Standard and Poor's —theonly study
to do so —butthey did not distinguish between the initial and the second rating
change. Along the same line, it should be noted that in recent years S&P has
normally announced the ratings it Is reviewing and the likely direction of any
change before the rating Is formally revised.
6For individual issues, Fisher had regressed the logarithm of the yield to maturity,
adjusted for term structure, on the logs of (1) the coefficient of variation of the
firm's earnings, (2) the number of years without any default, (3) the ratio of
market value of equity to par value of debt and (4) the total market value of the
firm's publicly traded bonds. Separate cross—sectional regressions were estimated
for 1927, 1932, 1937, 1949, and 1953.—26—
7However, examination of West's results suggests that the dividing line may have
been between Baa and Ba issues, rather than between A and Baa issues as he argued.
While the residuals on bonds rated Ba and below were strongly positive, the residu-
als on Baa bonds were split roughly 50—50 over the two sample years combined.In
the 1949 sample, 8 of the Baa issues had positive residuals and 12 negative. In
1953 the split was 15 and 8. For bonds rated Ba and below the split was 12(+) and
2(—) in 1949 and 14(+) and 2(—) in '53.
8Our analysis is in terms of yields and yield spreads. While a price format might
seem theoretically preferable and more consistent with the conventional approach to
asset valuation, yield spreads are more meaningful intuitively and have some the-
oretical advantages as well. Tt has been shown elsewhere [Bierman and Hass (1975),
and Yawitz (1977)] that under certain reasonable conditions the relationship between
yields and default risk is independent of the bond's maturity and whether. it sells
above or below par. However, the impact of default risk on price is not independent
of term to maturity for bonds not selling at par.
9The bond market was basically stable over these three days with declines approxima-
tely equaling advances. If the bond traded February 28, this price was used to
calculate Y. If it did not, March 1 or February 27 prices were used. Small trades
were excluded.
101f the firm had twobondissues with different ratings —invariablybecause of
different subordination status —oneof each was included. If there was a choice of
issues with the same rating, the issue(s) with the longest term to maturity was
chosen.
110r that ratings influence yields because of government regulations.
121he inclusion of all possible measures in c is, however, to be avoided for theor-
etical as well as statistical reasons. If th true C1 is quite large then the
processing of this information may be quite costly. In that case ratings would be
useful simply because they are a more efficient source of the information.
13Total sales were also tried empirically as an alternative measure of size. The
results were similarto those presented below but the goodness of fit was reduced.
14The weighted average form which was estimated was
Coy' =(WC + w2C_1 + w3C_2 + '/C_3+w5Ct_4) (W + + + w4+w5)
where C is the most recent coverage figure. Since the estimated W was .998, this
is essentially a simple average, and that was used for computationalease.
15Closely related to the power transformation y is the Box-Tidwell or Box—Cox
transformation, (y —1)/x.The latter has the advantage that it is continuous at
zero and urn [(yX —1)/ X] =in(y), so it includes the log form as a special
x+o
case. However, estimation of a large Box—Tidweil model where X varies from variable
to variable is difficult and proved to be impossible here. Consequently the power
transformation was chosen. This form is not continuous at zero hut can approximate
thelog form with suitable choices of the exponent and coefficients.—27—
16Neither Moody's nor S&P consistently rates Industrial bond issues higher than the
other (Ederington, 1983) and neither seems to assign any particular rating more
often. Moreover, several bond portfolio managers have indicated to the authors that
they view them as representing roughly equal risk levels. Nonetheless this assump-
tion is tested below.
17Remaining differences in marketability may however be reflected in the variable
ASSET.
'8Using government bonds selling within SZ of par value, we estimated the following
yield curve:
yielda +.088[1/YEARS] +u=whereYEARS represents
years to maturity. We then adjusted all Y to a 25 year bond basis using:
=Y—.088Ni/YEARS) —.04].
'9This is the effective rate faced by the marginal investor which may be lower than
t because the discount is taxed as capital gains and/or because this tax is deferred
until the issue is sold or matures. In the latter case, t will vary with the term
to maturity but this is ignored.
20A rise (fall) in U. after the bond is issued, i.e., the coupon rate is set, will
cause an equal rise n both V and TAX.
211n other words, 'ofequation 6 was dropped and separate 's were estimated for





BBB or Baa .04 1.10
BB or Ba .75 1.09
B 1.81 1.41
CCC 3.18
22The sum of the squared errors from the unrestricted equation was 59.46 which
yields an F of 2.33 with 4 and 162 degrees of freedom.
23There were also a couple of issues for which PRO was negative. Since PROX
is an imaginary number for —1 <X<1,these had to be dropped from the sample when
PRO was included.
24F statistics were constructed from the unexplained sum of squares shown in the
paper. The two F statistics were 65.4 for the linear form and33.2 for the log form
while the critical value of F with 4 and 163 d. f. is 2.45 at the .05 level.
250f course size may be correlated with measures of riskiness other than coverage
and leverage and may be simply a proxy for these variables. This seems particularly
likely since the smaller firms which turned to the bond market may have done so
because they found it difficult to arrange private financing.—28—
26For the hypothesis that the ratings provide no additional information beyond that
contained in Cj the F statistic is 9.35 while the critical value of F at the .05
level is 2.07. For the null hypothesis that the accounting measures and SUB add no
information beyond that contained in Cj, the F statistic is 11.64 while the critical
value is 1.94.
is tempting to hypothesize that the AA and A dummies are insignificant because
information on these firms is more readily available and that the lower ratings are
significant because information on these is less readily available so market parti-
cipants rely on ratings. However, this can not explain why the AAand A dummies are
insignificant when *isregressed on ratings only.
28lssues rated A by oneagency and Baa or BBB by the other were excluded from this
analysis.
29However, the hypotheses that the variance of the residuals is the same for the two
groups cannot be rejected at the .05 level though it can be rejected at the .10
level. Since the difference in average yields between ratings is much larger for
the lower ratings, ratings cannot be expected to capture all differences in risk of
default so this result is not too surprising.
300n the other hand, a positive 0 could beobserved becauserating agencies use
observed market yields as a guide to selling ratings so that recent ratings are more
closely related to market yields.
31 =.52with an estimated standard error of .24.
32Virtually all long—term industrial and commercial bond issues meeting our require;
ments (e.g., five years of historical data) are rated by at least one agency, so
this question could not be addressed here. However, this may not be true forcom-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Sample Stratified by Moody's and
Standard & Poor's Ratings
MOODY'S RATING
S Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B
T
A AAA .23 2 0 0 0 0
N
D
A AA 5 24 5 1 0 0
R
D
A A 0 4 35 3 0 0
N
D




BB 0 0 0 7 12 2
S
R
A B 0 0 0 0 5 24
I
I
N CCC 0 0 0 0 0 3
GTable 3
Estimation Results
Estimated Parameters and (Asymptotic Standard Errors)
Ratings Non—Rating Measures
Variable Only of Creditworthiness Only Combined
AA or Aa rating .077 —.016
(.088) (.076)
A rating .179 .011
(.079) (.078)
BBB or Baa rating 1.116 .509
- (.094) (.111)
BB or Ba rating 1.763 1.345
(.097) (.143)
B rating 3.2O4 2.300
(.087) (.183)
CCC rating 7.125 3.364
(.615) (.519)


















TAX —.059 —.164 —.085
(.025) (.080) (.069)
CALL .006 —.006 .049
(.078) (.025) (.022)
y weighting factor .548 .438
(.128) (.161)
Intercept 9.120 8.708 8.963
(.129) (.183) (.347)
Adjusted R2 .799 .818 .869
Unexplained Sum of Squares 62.892 56.48 38.97Table 4
Tests of Yield Differences Between Ratings
Null Hypotheses: Asymptotic t—statistics from regression:
No difference in
'f* between Without accounting With accounting
issues rated* variables variables
Aaa&Aa .88 —.21
Aa & A 1.29 .41
A & Baa 10.52 5.92
Baa & Ba 6.17 8.22
Ba & B 14.24 9.36
B & Caa 6.35 2.23
*tloody'ssymbols are used to represent both Moody's and Standard and
Poor's ratings.TABLE 5
Significance Tests on Accounting Variables
F Statistic for null hypothesis
that *isunrelated to that
variable





*significant at .05 levelTable 6
Estimated Changes in Yield to Maturity Resulting From
Changes in Each Accounting Variable
Estimated Changes in Y in basis points resulting from
changes in independent variables
Ratings not Held Constant Ratings Held Constant
Change from: Change from:
• Percentile Values: 20th percen— Median to 80th 20th percen— Median to 80th
Variable 20th Median 80thtile to medianpercentile tile to medianpercentile
ASSET
(billions) .594 2.424 7.424 —47.7 —20.1 —16.1 —4.7
COV 2.794 5.291 10.368 —23.5 —10.4 —2.1 —.3
LEV .206 .327 .552 8.0 37.8 3.3 16.4
STDCOV .805 1.499 3.002 —4.7 —1.6 —7.0 —5.5Table 7
The Explanatory Power of Ratings
and Accounting Information
Separated by Issue Quality
Mean Squared Error*
Intragroup (and Z of Variance Explained)
Variance of Accounting
Ratings Measures
Groups Only Only Both
Issues rated .276 .259 .271 .228
A or above (.06) (.02) (.17)
Issues rated 1.473 .492 .352 .204
Baa or below (.67) (.76) (.86)
*In percentage points, i.e., .276 =27.6basis points.REFERENCES
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